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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BILLIE PETERSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

CASE NO.

960271
950700314

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Statement of Jurisdiction
The

Utah

Supreme

pursuant to U.C.A.

Court

has

jurisdiction

Section 78-2-2(3)(j).

of

this

matter

The matter has been

poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 42, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Statement of Issues and Standard of Review
1.

Whether Mr. Peterson is entitled to receive no-fault wage

benefits in addition to the temporary total disability payments he
received as worker's compensation payments.
2.

The standard for review is in the interpretation of a

statute, a question of law, reviewed for correctness.

State of

Utah v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993); Shurtz v. BMW of
North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
Determinative Statutes
Section 31A-22-309 (3) (a) , Utah Code Annotated
State of Utah, 889 P.2d 922.

and Neel v.

Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case
Billie Peterson was injured in a truck rollover on September
6,

1993.

Peterson

The rollover was the fault of a co-employee.
claimed

no-fault

wage

benefits

from

Allstate,

Mr.
which

insured the truck in which he was riding, because his regular
weekly wage far exceeded the weekly wage loss benefits paid to him
by his employer's worker's compensation carrier.
Before

his

injury,

approximately $1,721.

Mr.

Peterson's

weekly

income

was

Following his injury, he was paid worker's

compensation wage benefits of $377 per week, thus producing a
weekly income reduction of approximately $1,344.

(R.48; 33).

Course of the Proceedings
Mr. Peterson filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment
that he was entitled to receive the maximum of $250 in no-fault
benefits to partially make up or reduce his weekly wage shortfall
between his pre-injury and post-injury wage loss.

His complaint

was dismissed.
Statement of Facts
1.

On September 6, 1993, Billie Peterson was employed by R&O

Construction Company of Ogden, Utah.
2.

Mr. Peterson and a co-employee were assigned to a job site

in Nevada.
3.

The co-employee was driving his private truck to the job

site in Nevada.
4.

Mr. Peterson was a passenger in the truck.

Both Mr. Peterson and the co-employee driver were being
2

paid some reduced wage compensation for their travel time.
5.

While driving west on 1-80

in Tooele County, the co-

employee apparently fell asleep at the wheel.
roadway and rolled.

The truck left the

The driver was killed and Mr. Peterson was

severely injured.
6.

At the time of his injury, Mr. Peterson was earning

approximately $1,721 per week.
7.

Following his

injury, Mr. Peterson received

worker's

compensation benefits in the form of temporary total disability
payments in the amount of $377 per week.
8.

Mr. Peterson's co-employee and driver of the truck in

question was insured by Allstate Insurance Company for no-fault
insurance purposes.
9.

Mr. Peterson contends that he is entitled to be paid the

statutory maximum of $250 per week by Allstate under the no-fault
statute over and above the $377 per week he was receiving in
worker's compensation benefits, because his weekly wage, in this
instance, far exceeded the combination of those two sums, and
pursuant to the Utah No-Fault Statute, he was entitled to have
those sums combined.
10.

Following briefing and argument, the trial court granted

the insurance company's Motion for Summary Judgment, ruling that
Mr. Peterson was not entitled to receive no-fault wage benefits in
addition to the worker's compensation benefits he did receive,
because the weekly worker's compensation benefits of $377 exceeded
the weekly amount set forth in the no-fault statute.
3

Summary of the Argument
Mr. Peterson is entitled to receive $250 per week in no-fault
wage benefits for a period of 52 weeks because his pre-injury
weekly

wage

and

thus

his

post-injury

weekly

income

loss

far

exceeded the maximum statutory amounts payable to him under either
the worker's compensation statute or the no-fault statute, or both
in combination.
Argument
Under

the Utah

Code, a no-fault

insurer

is permitted

to

exclude or limit from coverage under its policy any liability for
injuries which are compensable under the Utah Workers' Compensation
Statute.

The statute states that

lf

[t]he benefits payable to any

injured person under Section 31A-22-3 07 are reduced by . . . any
benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a
result of an accident covered

in this code under any workers'

compensation or similar statutory plan."

U.C.A. Section 31A-22-

309(3)(a).
The statute's exclusionary provision has been interpreted by
the Utah Court of Appeals in Bevans v. Industrial Commission, 790
P. 2d 573, 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) and by the Utah Supreme Court in
Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 925 (Utah 1995).

These courts agree

that "the no-fault insurer is permitted by this statute to exclude
from coverage provided under its insurance policy any liability for
injuries

that

are compensable

under

the workers'

compensation

statute. . . ." Bevans 790 P. 2d at 577. However, the Utah Supreme
Court made it clear in Neel that the statute does not mean that a
4

no-fault insurer may exclude all

of its liability merely because

this injured party is entitled to workers' compensation benefits.
Neel,

889 P.d

at 925.

The Neel court stated

that

"where an

accident is covered by both workers' compensation and no-fault
insurance, the statute permits. . . [exclusion of] some liability—
that which is compensable under workers' compensation. . . . " Id.
However,

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

notes

that

where

state

statutes provide "that PIP benefits will be reduced by workers'
compensation benefits as does Section 31A-22-309(3)(a). . . [those]
states

have

recovered.

uniformly

allowed

both

types

of

benefits" to

Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 925 (Utah 1995).

be
The

court cites two main goals for allowing no-fault insurers to limit
liability when workers' compensation is available.

The first goal

is to insure that the injured party does not receive duplicative
benefits.

Neel v. State, 889 P.2d

922, 925

(citing Tate v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 815 P.2d 15, 19 (Colo. 1991)).
The second goal is to coordinate benefits received Neel v. State,
889 P.2d 922, 925 (citing Allstate Insurance Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co.
of Michigan, 437 N.W.2d 338, 339 (Mich. App. 1989).

However, in

this instance, Mr. Peterson does not seek duplicative benefits.
Instead, he seeks to reduce the magnitude of his weekly wage loss
by receiving no-fault benefits for his uncompensated wage loss.
Additionally,
legislature
against

intended

injured

the
PIP

Neel

court

states

that

"[h]ad

the

insurers to have an absolute defense

employees,

lawmakers

could

have

easily

added

language to the statute indicating this intent," but they did not
5

do so. Neel v. State. 889 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 1995).

Instead, the

no-fault insurance statute provides personal injury protection in
the form of recompense for medical expenses, household services,
loss of earnings, funeral expenses and compensation on account of
death be provided in such a policy.

And, these benefits are not

excludable just because one is entitled to workers' compensation.
Neel v. State. 889 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 1995).
With the goals of non-duplicative benefits and coordination of
insurance benefits in mind, the Neel court states that "[n]o-fault
insurers. . . are required to pay PIP benefits to injured employees
to

the

extent

benefits."
The

those

benefits

exceed

workers'

compensation

Neel, 889 P.2d 922 at 926.
Utah

calculation.
calculation

courts

do

not

specify

a

method

of

benefit

Nevertheless, other courts have offered methods of
as between workers' compensation

and

no-fault

PIP

benefits which are consistent with the Utah statute and the holding
See generally,

in Neel.

Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922 (Utah 1995).

For example, in Comeau v. Safeco Ins. Co. America, 356 So.2d 790,
791

(Fla. 1978), a Florida case, a plaintiff was injured while

driving

a tractor-trailer.

He received

workers'

compensation

benefits, however, those benefits did not totally compensate for
his loss.
insurer

The plaintiff sought to recover PIP benefits.

paid

him

some

PIP

benefits.

However,

the

The

insurer

discontinued payment when the workers' compensation benefit, plus
the paid PIP benefits exceeded the statutorily required policy
limit.

Comeau v. Safeco Insurance Co. America, 356 So.2d 790, 792
6

(Fla. 1978).
The insurer argued that their liability was reduced below the
statutorily required limit because the plaintiff received workers'
compensation.
judgment.

The

lower

court

granted

the

insurer

The Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the trial

court's interpretation of an insurer's allowable
liability.

summary

limitation of

Instead, the court held that "an insurer is required to

supplement worker's compensation benefits until the insurer has
itself paid the limits of liability under its policy for required
personal injury protection benefits."

Comeau v. Safeco Ins. Co.

America, 356 So.2d 790, 794 (Fla. 1978).
The Comeau court maintained that because PIP protection is
intended to be a primary source of recompense for anyone injured in
an automobile accident, PIP benefits should be paid in full whether
or not other coverage exists. Xd at 791.
that

the

exclusion

purpose
for

of

allowing

the no-fault

The court further stated

a workers' compensation

insurer

to

prevent

benefit

"attempt[s]

to

recover for loss not sustained [or] to recover twice for the same
loss"

but it is "not intended to reduce the limits of liability

under the statutory minimum required for personal injury protection
benefits."
(Fla. 1978).

Comeau v. Safeco Ins. Co. America, 356 So.2d 790, 794
Therefore, because the plaintiff was not trying to

receive duplicative benefits, but merely seeking due compensation,
he was entitled to both PIP and workers' compensation benefits.
Another case delineating the method of calculation where PIP
and workers' compensation benefits are applicable is Kovarnik v.
7

Royal Globe Ins. Co,, 363 So.2d 166, 168 (Fla. App. 1978).

In

Kovarnik, the plaintiff, a truck driver, was injured "when the
company
Kovarnik

car
v.

he

was

Royal

driving
Globe

was

Ins.

struck

Co. ,

363

by

another

So.2d

at

vehicle."
168.

The

plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits were insufficient to
cover his loss, therefore, he made a claim against his own no-fault
insurer for PIP benefits. Id.

The no-fault claim was denied.

The

insurer denied the claim because the plaintiff received workers'
compensation benefits. Kovarnik v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 363 So.2d
166,168

(Fla. App. 1978).

summary judgment.

The lower court granted defendant's

The case was reversed.

The appellate court noted that the no-fault insurer was not
justified in denying PIP benefits merely because the plaintiff had
received some workers' compensation benefits.

Kovarnik v. Royal

Globe Ins. Co. . 363 So.2d 166, 168 (Fla. App. 1978).

The court

stated that "[a]lthough a claimant cannot receive both workers'
compensation benefits and PIP benefits in such a manner as to be
over compensated for the same injury; still workers' compensation
benefits received by a claimant do not decrease the total amount of
PIP coverage available under the policy."

Kovarnik v. Royal Globe

Ins. Co., 363 So.2d at 168.
The Kovarnik

court, indicating the correct method of benefit

calculation between workers' compensation and PIP benefits, stated
that:
If
workmens'
compensation
benefits
are
available, PIP benefits are still primary;
however to the extent that payments of
workmens' compensation are made, PIP benefits
8

are supplemental until either the injured
party has been fully compensated or until the
PIP carrier has paid its policy limits.
Kovarnik v. Royal Globe Ins. Co. , 363 So.2d 166, 168 (Fla. App.
1978) .
A Utah Court of Appeals case, Bevans, addressed the issue of
what payments are required by workers' compensation carriers when
PIP benefits are received.

Bevans v. Industrial Commission, 790

P.2d 573 (Utah App. 1978).

The Industrial Commission allowed the

workers7 compensation carrier to exclude from benefits available
those benefits paid by the PIP insurer.

The appellate court held

that the Industrial Commission did not have authority to allow the
workers' compensation insurer such a deduction.

Id. at 577.

The workers' compensation carrier cited U.C.A. Section 31A-22309(3) (a)

as

allowing

an

analogous

exclusion

for

workers'

compensation payments where PIP benefits were received
injured party.

by the

The court stated that this statute was irrelevant

to the facts and that workers' compensation benefits could not be
reduced in such a manner.

Bevans v. Industrial Commission, 790

P.2d

1978).

573, 577

(Utah App.

In dicta, the Bevans

court

interpreted U.C.A. Section 31A-22-309(3)(a) as permitting the nofault

insurer

to

"exclude

from

coverage

provided

under

its

insurance policy any liability for injuries that are compensable
under the workers' compensation statute,11

and no more.

The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of PIP and workers'
compensation benefits for the same injury in Neel v. State, 889
P.2d 922 (Utah 1995).

In Neel v. State the plaintiff was injured
9

"while

riding

employment-"

in

a

state-owned

car

in

the

course

Neel v. State, 889 P. 2d 922 at 925,

of

her

Her employer

paid all of her workers' compensation benefits, but refused to pay
PIP benefits. The plaintiff sought to recover the PIP benefits for
"loss

of

household

services,

second-job

wage

loss,

and

the

difference between wage reimbursement under workers' compensation
(seventy percent of lost wages) and under PIP (eighty-five percent
of lost wages)."

Id.

The employer, the State of Utah, refused to

pay the PIP benefits because the state's self-insurance policy
specifically excluded coverage of any injury for which one was
entitled to workers' compensation.

Ic|.

The Utah Supreme Court

held that such an exclusion was invalid because it was "not in
harmony with statutory requirements."
at 926.
PIP

Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922

The court interpreted the no-fault statute as requiring

payments

benefits.

even

where

one

received

workers'

compensation

Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 1995).

The Neel

court allowed that PIP benefits are only payable to the extent that
the damages aren't covered by the workers' compensation benefits.
In Neel the court specifically states that the no-fault insurer
must pay PIP benefits that are
compensation."
has

paid

Mr.

"not already

paid

Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922 at 925.
Peterson

any

money

for

his

$1,344

by workers'
Here, no one
weekly

wage

shortfall.
Billie

Peterson

should,

therefore,

receive

workers'

compensation and PIP benefits for his injuries until he is fully
compensated or until the PIP insurer pays up to the policy limit.
10

Although
calculation

the

Utah

between

courts

no-fault

do

not

PIP

specify

and

the

workers'

method

of

compensation

benefits, they do make clear the receiving of workers' compensation
does not exclude the injured party from receiving additional PIP
benefits.

In Utah, if one's workers' compensation benefits do not

cover benefits provided by PIP, then one is entitled to receive
those PIP benefits beyond workers' compensation

coverage.

Of

course, no plaintiff may recover duplicative benefits, but to the
extent that worker's compensation doesn't cover one's damages, the
PIP benefits must be paid.

Here, Mr. Peterson's weekly wage far

exceeds available benefits under workers' compensation or PIP.
Likewise, the difference

between his weekly

wage and workers'

compensation payments received far exceeds the available maximum
amount under PIP. Thus, there is no overlap or duplication of wage
benefits received.
Billie Peterson, like the plaintiff in Neel whose workers'
compensation benefits for lost wages did not cover her loss, should
be paid PIP benefits to make up that difference.

Further, any

benefits that are not covered under workers' compensation, but are
covered under the no-fault scheme must be paid.

(e.g. household

service benefits).
The Utah court's

interpretation of U.C.A.

Section

31A-22-

309(3) (a) indicates that although a no-fault insurer doesn't have
to

pay

for

compensation,

the

same

they

benefits

still

have

one
to

receives
adhere

to

under
their

workers'
policy

commitments. The adoption of goals of non-duplicative benefits and
11

coordination of benefits by the court in Neel shows the court's
understanding

of

the

importance

of

the

different

purposes

of

recompense under the workers' compensation and no-fault statutes.
Workers' compensation is designed to compensate one injured on
the job.

PIP benefits required in a no-fault insurance policy are

designed to compensate anyone injured in an automobile accident.
The court's reluctance to allow insurance providers an absolute
defense

when

workers'

compensation

benefits

come

into

play

indicates a desire to coordinate benefits, not deny them.

The

approach suggested by Mr. Peterson merely coordinates the benefits
granted by the respective coverages in circumstances where, as
here, the weekly wage far exceeds the total benefits payable under
the two types of coverage.
Any injury sustained by Billie Peterson that is not covered by
workers' compensation, but is covered under the no-fault, PIP must
be paid.

The Neel and Bevans decisions interpret U.C.A. Section

31A-22-309(3)(a) as requiring the insurer to pay benefits to the
extent

that

the

injuries

are

not

covered

under

workers'

compensation.
The argument asserted by Allstate
worker's

compensation

benefits

(that because the weekly

exceeded

statutory

no-fault

benefits, thus completely eliminating any obligation to pay nofault

wage

compensation)

is

inconsistent

with

the

court's

interpretation of the allowable liability exclusion under U.C.A.
Section

31A-22-309(3)(a)

in

the

Neel

and

Bevans

decisions.

Although the Utah courts allow no-fault insurers to exclude some
12

liability when one is entitled to workers' compensation, the courts
clearly do not allow a total dismissal of liability.

The only

benefits that the no-fault insurer is allowed to exclude are those
specifically paid by workers' compensation.
and PIP benefits are not identical.

Workers' compensation

PIP benefits are available

above and beyond workers' compensation benefits and the no-fault
insurer must pay them in circumstances where the earnings level of
the injured employee permits.
Allstate

appears

to

be

asserting

defendant-insurers did in Kovarnik.

the

same

argument

the

That is, that their liability

is off-set by workers' compensation up to the statutorily required
policy limit for no-fault PIP benefits.

The Utah court's have

never said this is the correct method of calculation between nofault and workers' compensation.
holding

in

Kovarnik

that,

Utah, in essence, agrees with the

PIP

benefits

supplement

workers'

compensation. However, Utah's language says that no-fault insurers
pay

to

the

extent

that

workers' compensation

doesn't.

This

language is consistent with the concept of PIP as supplemental to
workers'

compensation.

The

court's

holding

in

Neel

is

not

consistent with the notion that insurers may reduce their liability
below the statutorily required minimum for PIP benefits because of
workers' compensation.
Allstate misinterprets the Utah Supreme Court's holding in
Neel.

Allstate's argument further ignores the goals cited for

allowing any exclusion of PIP benefits.
insure

that

one

doesn't

receive
13

The goals are only to

duplicative

benefits

and

to

coordinate benefits. The idea of coordinating benefits presupposes
that there will be more than one source of benefits to coordinate.
Conclusion
Billie Peterson should be paid PIP benefits to the extent that
they are not duplicative of workers' compensation benefits.

The

argument asserted by Allstate, that they may reduce their liability
below

the

statutorily

inconsistent with

required

the court's

limit

of

interpretation

PIP

benefits

of the

is

statutory

exclusion provision and the Utah case law.
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Robert G Gilchrist
Attorneys for Defendant
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ADDENDUM B

JAMES R. HASENYAGER
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN LC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2408 Van Buren Avenue
Ogden, Utah 844 01
Telephone: (801) 621-3 662
Utah State Bar No. 1404
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

NOTICE OF APPEAL

BILLIE PETERSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Civil No. 950700314

vs.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Judge:

Defendant/Appellee.

Glen Dawson

Notice is hereby given that plaintiff/appellant, Billie
Peterson,

through

counsel

James

R.

Hasenyager

of

the

firm

MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court
the Order Granting Defendant Allstate Insurance Company's Motion
for

Summary

m^ y

Judgment

signed

DATED this S

by

the

Honorable

day o&Ztt*^-^

Glen

Dawson

1996.

MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN

on

Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co.
Page 2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
**********************

r

I hereby certify that on this

*-~>

JUMday of -May, 1996,

I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Notice
of Appeal, postage prepaid, to the following:
Robert G. Gilchrist
50 South Main #700
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111
SE<^RETARY

|

JAMES R. HASENYAGER
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN LC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2408 Van Buren Avenue
Ogden, Utah 844 01
Telephone: (801) 621-3662
Utah State Bar No. 1404
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CERTIFICATE THAT TRANSCRIPT IS
NOT REQUIRED

BILLIE PETERSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Civil No. 950700314

vs.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Judge:

Defendant/Appellee.

Glen Dawson

Appellant, through counsel James R. Hasenyager of the
firm

of

MARQUARDT,

HASENYAGER

&

CUSTEN,

certifies

that

transcript will be requested in the above-entitled case.
DATED this J

day oU JCn^U?

, 1996.

MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN

no

Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co.
Page 2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
**********************

I hereby certify that on this
I

mailed

^7

a true and correct copy of the

\

day of -May, 1996,
above

and

foregoing

Certificate That Transcript is Not Required, postage prepaid, to
the following:
Robert G. Gilchrist
50 South Main #700
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111
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SECRETARY

OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BOND NO. 1151708
UNDERTAKING
FOR COST

BILLIE PETERSON.
(Plaintiff/Appellant)

Case No- 950700314
VS.

Judge: Glen Dawson

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
[Defendant/Appellee)

WHEREAS, the above-named plaintiff desires to give an undertaking for COST as provided by
Section 63-30-19 of the Utah Code Annotated.
NOW, THEREFORE, Old Republic Surety Company, a corporation duly licensed to do business in
the State of Utah, as Surety, does hereby obligate itself, its successors and assigns to the above named
defendants under said statutory obligations in the sum of THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS and NO/100 ($300.00**)

DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah the 1st day of August

t

1996.

OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY

Its: F^Uileen Fowler, Attorney-iiFnict

AFFIDAVIT OF QUALIFICATION

STATE OF UTAH

County of Salt Lake

Kathleen Fowler appeared personally before me and declared that she is the Attorney-in-Fact of the Old
Republic Surety Company, and that she Is duly authorized to execute and deliver the foregoing obligation;
that said Company is authorized to execute the same and has complied in all respects with that laws of
Utah, in reference to becoming sole surety upon bonds, undertakings and obligations.

T

Kathleen Fowier/fluorney-in-Fact

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 1st Day of August, 1996.
NOTARY PUBLIC
BARBARA J. NORTH
405 South Main #800
S.L.C., UT
04111
COMMISSION EXPIRES
MAY 2 1 , 1999
STATF OF UTAH

My commission expires

C/S//99

l

nduLtat ' L Y[uMrk
u
Notary Public
Salt Lake City, Utah

ROWEFVDF ATTORNEY
:

i f l S y D W A L L ^ E ^ S ^ T H E S J E PRESENCES: T h & p ^ B ^ ^
K - A J H t E E H - F B » L ER F ^ _ F W W t ~ A £ £ : G T R f f i 1

W

"Wts".t@i&1aSd lawful #t&ney^:in^aiGt; wjtfrfiffl f^erar^uthorftylor aflctorftefcaL^
to^xecuteand deliver and affixihe seal of the
"^r^hyi8eftt6i[i£a sSat"S.^gtr^ t^n^^anaJBMk^'srre^nlzgic® or ofhepMe^tiJ^iticgsti the h^ethereof, pother than bail bonds* bank depository
5bd^L7®Qjftggge ^ f i t f e i ^ ^
fete
gffiftantyljonds, self-msurance-workers compensation
p5crK^
B6hd"§fhaacdous waste remediation bonds or Mack king bonds),

A G G R E G A T E OF
WSUED

FOR

THF

OBLIGATION.

: l ^ f c i ^ ^
^gafifii^i^
IJifi&^Mkls^^
^?"fe^W"tt6'4Bi^^

pursuant to these presents, are
This appointment is made
Power of Attorney is signed and sealed
b y i b e boanSx>f directors of the OLD REPUBLIC SURETY

^ Z? R E ^ # p € C 4 ^ K f r i 0 p r e p & S f t f i ^ ^
•. - ^ S f j f ^ a r y ^ m a v ^ a ^
t."~ p W # c f f case,;M? and oM&efraffcoltfce^jT^ahy
ftjS^^riiz^
=rjgggfy^Gw^
^ ^ ^ E § £ ^ E D FUfilHEf^^
:: % S ; | M ~ 3 ^ ^ ^ ^

with Ihe secretary or any assistant
evidencing ihe appointment
a l i ^ f e tMe sealitf the company to bonds, undertakings,
anysuch attorney-in-fact or agent and revoke
^ shall t)e valid and binding upon the Compaay
attested and sealed (if a seal be required} by any secretary or assistant

^pfA&^^

--

fef^^cut^^di^liyef

" - "

:

--- t # ( ' i } f f l ^ ^ 9 ^ ^ y ^f§ p f ^ ^ r f r a n y M ^ ^ i d e f i j or 3ssis%i"vic&3^.i^f,3"ecf6tary"0f assistant secretary, and countersigned and sealed (ft a seal

X , j F | ^ ^ e C d u l ^ x § a j t e d S ^ ^ e ^ ^ ^ i f ^ j i ^ ^ ^ u i S c ^ ^ # e o r nrt^attorneys-m-factpr a ^ n t l pursuant to and within the limits of the authority
:
S £ ^ v i d e n c e d |yjheJ>oweMf Attorney i s ^ ^
ft:-"^^QLfEE
f^fpMEf^fhatthe1 sigriStile-StM£altertzeWirceftarid the seal Cthe company may be affixed by facsimile to any Power of Attorney or
^-l^er^afto^here^a
recognizance, or other suretyship obligations of the-company; and such
^fef-^dliti/eand seal when-so used ^allhav^ the same force an'dre.f f eetr ias^tliough "-rHanul»{y affixed. ::--^>
-^ l i ^ P 3 ^ ^ p ^ R E 0 R Oftj^EPti^^^
to_be signed by its proper officer, and its
c q r p p r a p ^ g ^ l ^ S f f t e e d ^ f h t s _ M ^ J M ^ - ^ ^ f - MA^ r ^ W ^ -;
^ ^ 9 ^ ^^^
;
^
"
"
^
l ^ O L D REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY

^^7.
r

'_-r t^ssfatant Secret^

President

P^^€)BMaSCDMSIN,BOUNTY QF \A£AUKESHA.

^ H £ ^

SS

JAMES E LEE
MAY
^hf#hfg ;^2BTM
19
9 6 - pBmnnRlly^flm^ before me,
^day of
anc* B ^ m ^ ^ f f l Z E L M o me;t<n^
REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY who executed the
aboveifistrurnent, andi they M c h acknowfeclged-th^
of the same; and being by me/duly sworn, did severally dispose and say,
hat they are the^said officers of.the ^Cffpomtfon aforesaid, and that^the seal affixed to the above instrument is the seal of the corporation.
md that said corporate seal and tfteir iigriatures as such officers were duly affixed and subscribed to the said instrument by the authority
> f t h e ^ ^ M t i i r e o t o r s o f satd < ^ i ^ a # o h _ v
^ ^ ^ ^ ^
'::r '-:•-•:
-V---.--;- / ? t
^—

<?J

^

^ < s ^

Notary Public
?ffi ^ f f i 02/23/57
My commission expires:

^ f p h e undersigned,-assManf secretary of the QLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY, a-Wisconsin corporation, CERTIFY that the
5M9^ifl9j
Attorney remains in fufl force and has not been revoked; and furthermore, that the Resolutions of the board
fcd&ej38£$ set ^forlh inr the^ P o w e r s Attorney, are now in ^orce, - j
:.
^, . - -

?4&-.S)Bff

^ ^ ^ ^ ^

Signed and seaied-at the .Ctty.jaf Brookfteldt Wfthis

1 sr

^
WfiSV

•SE^R*^R^^llSU'RA^ECe•^•I•*ffc.

day of

-Angusr

, 19
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ADDENDUM C

JAMES R. HASENYAGER
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN LC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2408 Van Buren Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-3662
Utah State Bar No. 1404
IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

DOCKETING STATEMENT

BILLIE PETERSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

CASE NO. CfbOZ-l

vs.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant/Appellee.

1. Date of Entry of Judgment or Order Appealed From:

May 23,

2.

None.

1996.

3.
Motions:

Nature of Post-Judgment Motions and Date Filed:

Date and Effect of Orders Disposing of Post-Judgment
Not applicable.

4.

Date of Filing of Notice of Appeal:

5.

Jurisdiction:

June 5, 1996.

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this

matter pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated.
6.

Name of Trial Court:

This is an appeal from the Second

Judicial District Court of Davis County, the Honorable Glen Dawson,
District Court Judge.
7.

Statements of Facts:
A. On September 6, 1993, Billie Peterson was employed by

R & 0 Construction Company of Ogden, Utah.

Peterson v. Allstate
Page 2
B.

Mr. Peterson and a co-employee were assigned to a job

site in Nevada.
C.

The co-employee was driving his private truck to the

job site in Nevada.
D.

Mr. Peterson was a passenger in the truck.

Both Mr. Peterson and the co-employee driver were

being paid some wage compensation for their travel time.
E.

While driving west on 1-80 in Tooele County, the co-

employee apparently fell asleep at the wheel.
roadway and rolled.

The truck left the

The driver was killed and Mr. Peterson was

severely injured.
F.

At the time of his injury, Mr. Peterson was earning

approximately $721 per week.
G.

Following his injury, Mr. Peterson received worker's

compensation benefits and temporary total disability payments in
the amount of $377 per week.
H. Mr. Peterson's co-employee and driver of the truck in
question was insured by Allstate Insurance Company for no-fault
insurance purposes.
I.

Mr. Peterson has contended that he is entitled to be

paid the maximum of $250 per week under the no-fault coverage
through Allstate Insurance Company, which payments should be made
over and above the $377 per week he was receiving

in worker's

compensation benefits, because his weekly wage far exceeded the
combination of those two sums and pursuant to the Utah No-Fault
Statute, he was entitled to have those sums combined.

Peterson v. Allstate
Page 3
J.

Following briefing and argument, the trial court

granted the insurance company's motion for summary judgment ruling
that Mr. Peterson was not entitled to receive no-fault wage
benefits in addition to worker's compensation benefits he did
receive.
8.

Issues for Review and Standard of Review:
A. Whether Mr. Peterson is entitled to receive no-fault

wage benefits

in addition to the temporary

total disability

payments he received as workers compensation payments;
B.

The standard for review is in the interpretation of

a statute, a question of law, reviewed for correctness.
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993);

State v.

Shurtz v. BMW of North

America, Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
9.

Determinative Statutes and Case Law:

Section 31A-22-

309(3) (a), Utah Code Annotated and Neel v. State of Utah, 889 P.2d
922.
DATED this ^

day of

KWM^X^,

1996.

MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN

ki
JAMES R. HASENYAGER
Attorney for Plaintiff

Peterson v. Allstat
Page 4

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
**********************

I hereby certify that on this

~>

J//K^

day of WSy, 1996,

I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
Docketing Statement, postage prepaid, to the following:
Robert G. Gilchrist
50 South Main #700
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111
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922 Utah

Sue NEEL, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
STATE of Utah, Defendant and Appellee.
No 940282
Supreme Court of Utah
Feb 2, 1995

State employee who was injured in car
accident while riding in state-owned car in
course of her employment brought action to
recover personal injury protection (PIP) benefits against the state, as self-insurer The
Second District Court, Weber County, dismissed action, and employee appealed The
Court of Appeals, Bench, J , 854 P.2d 581,
reversed and remanded The Second District Court, Stanton M Taylor, J , entered
summary judgment for state, and employee
appealed The Supreme Court, Howe, J ,
held that workers' compensation exclusivity
provision did not bai action, overruling IML
Freight Inc v Otiosen
Reversed and remanded

1 Appeal and Error e=>842(2)
Because paities laised onh questions of
lau, Supieme Couit uould give tual couit's
legal conclusions no defeience and would re
vieu them for conectness
2 Insurance <^467 61(4)
Whether employee is entitled to personal injury protection (PIP) benefits cannot
turn on employer's decision to secure private
insurance or to self insure U C A 1953, 4 1 12a-407(2)
3 Insurance e=532 5(3)
Where automobile accident is covered bv
both workers compensation and no-fauit in
surance statute providing that personal inju
r\ protection (PIP) benefits are payable to
injuied employee but are reduced by benefits
which he receives undei workers' compensation permits no-fault insurer to exclude some
liability, that which is compensable under
workers compensation but not all liability,

overruling IML Freight, Inc v Ottosen, 5$
P2d 296 U.C.A.1953, 31A-22-309(3)(a)
4. Statutes e=>174
Supreme Court has no pouer to rewrite
statute to make it conform to an intention noi
expressed
5 Workers' Compensation <S=32084
Workers' compensation exclusivity provi
sion did not bar action for peisonal injury
protection (PIP) benefits undei Automobile
No-Fault Insurance Act brought against
State, as self-insurer, by state employee who
was injured in car accident while riding in
state-owned car in course of her employment
6 Insurance <5=>532.5(3)
No-fault insurers, including self-insurers, are required to pay personal injury pro
tection (PIP) benefits to injured employees
to extent that those benefits exceed workers'
compensation benefits
7. Insurance <S=>138(4)
Although state's self-insurance program
excludes personal injury protection (PIP)
benefits to any person entitled to workeis'
compensation benefits, this exclusion is not in
harmony with statutory requirements and is,
therefoie, invalid
U C A 1953, 31A-22309(3)(a)

Daniel L Wilson, Ogden, for plaintiff
Jan Graham, Atty Gen , Brent A Burnett,
Asst Atty Gen, Salt Lake City. for defen
dant
HOWE, Justice
Plaintiff Sue Neel brought this action
against her employei, the State of Utah to
collect personal injury protection ("PIP")
benefits undei Utah s Automobile No-Fault
Insurance Act The State initiall\ moved to
dismiss the complaint for failure to comply
with the lequnements of the Governmental
Immunity Act The trial court granted the
motion without prejudice
On appeal, the
Utah Court of Appeals held that because the
action sounded in contract, the procedural
requirements of the immunity act did not

Utah 923

N E E L v. STATE
Cite as 889 p.2d 922 (Utah 1995)

apply Neel v State, 854 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah
Ct.App.1993)
On remand, the State filed a motion for
summary judgment, contending that Neef
was barred from seeking PIP benefits from
the State by the exclusive remedy provision
of the Workers' Compensation Act The dis
tnct court granted the motion on that basis,
and Neel appeals
I

FACTS

Neel was injured in a car accident in December 1990 while nding in a state-owned
car in the course of her employment with the
State The State paid her all the workers'
compensation benefits to which she was entitled In this action, she seeks PIP benefits
to the extent those benefits were not covered
by workers' compensation, including reimbursement for loss of household services, second-job wage loss, and the difference between wage reimbursement under workers'
compensation (seventy percent of lost wages)
and under PIP (eighty-five percent of lost
wages) See Utah Code Ann § 31A-22-307
She contends that she is entitled to these
benefits under section 31A-22-309(3) of the
code, which provides, "The benefits payable
to any injured person under (the PIP statute) are reduced by (a) any benefits which
that person receives or is entitled to receive
as a result of an accident covered in this code
under
workers' compensation
At the time of the accident and all other
dates relevant to this action, the State selfinsured its motor vehicles as permitted by
statute See § 41-12a-301(4) The State's
self-msurance program expressly excluded
from coverage "bodily injury to any person
who is entitled to payments or benefits under
the provisions of Utah's Workers' Compensa
tion Law "
n

ANALYSIS

[1] The facts are not in dispute Because
the parties raise only questions of law, this
court gives the tnal courts legal conclusions
no deference and reviews them for correct
ness West Valley Citij Corp v Salt Lake
County 852 P 2d 1000, 1002 (Utah 1993)

This case confronts an apparent conflict
between Utah's no-fault and workers' compensation statutes The No-Fault Act requires that "fejvery policy of insurance or
combination of policies, purchased to satisfy
the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-l2a-301
shall also
include personal injury protection
^ 31A-22-302(2) (emphasis added) Section
41-12a-301(3)(a) declares that "the state
shall maintain owner's or operator's security
in effect continuously for their motor vehicles " Thus the State, along with all other
employers, is required to have PIP coverage
on its motor vehrcles
Meanwhile, the Workers' Compensation
Act provides
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an employee
shall be
the exclusive remedy against the employer
and the liabilities of the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at
common law or otherwise, to the employee
§ 35-1-60 (emphasis added) Hence, while
one statute requires every auto insurance
policy—including those held by employers—
to include PIP coverage, the other statute
arguably bars injured employees from recovering any benefits from that coverage
A

IML Freight

This is not an issue of first impression for
this court Nearly two decades ago, we de
cided a declaratory judgment action based on
this same conflict
IML Freight, Inc v
Ottosen 538 P 2d 296 (Utah 1975)
Neel
argues that IML Freight merely addressed
the instant issue in dicta However a review
of the bnefs filed by the parties in that case
and a careful reading of the opinion itself
have led us to conclude otherwise
IML Freight arose when employees of an
interstate trucking companv filed claims
against the compan>, requesting no fault
benefits
The company filed an action to
determine its responsibilities to compU with
the no-fault statute and, more specifically
whether the workers' compensation exclusivi
ty clause barred mjuied employees from ob

924
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taming benefits from their employeis' nofault coverage
The court framed the issue in teims of
whethei the exclusivity piovision "was le
pealed by the No-Fault concept' Id at 297
The court discussed the historical impoitance
of the exclusive remedy of woikeis' compen
sation and reasoned that discrimination
would result if an employee injuied in a
motoi vehicle could recover moie benefits
than an employee injured in anothei manner
Id
With little other discussion the court
held as follows
We believe and hold that the language
used by the legislature [in the no fault
statute) did not impose upon an employei
subject to the Workmen s Compensation
Act the heart-beat of which is exclusive
ness of remedy any additional buiden pei
sonally to pa> any injured employee extra,
who happened to drive a motor vehicle, as
against fellow employees who happened to
push dock dollies or ride cranes to then
injur v or death
Id (emphasis added)
[2] We find a number of problems with
this leasoning and holding First the woid
'personally in the holding implies that al
though an emplo\ei need not personally pay
PIP benefits perhaps the emplovei s pnvate
no fault insuier would have to do so See 2A
Ajthur Larson The Law oj Workmen s Corn
pensatwv S 7124(e) at 14-09 n 4 (1994)
(citing IML FJeight and speculating that its
holding ma\ appl\ onl\ to self insurer)
Whethei an employee is entitled to PIP ben
efit^ cannot tui n on the emplovei s decision
to secure private insurance or to self insure
See § 41-12a—407(2) (self insurers shall pav
benefits to peisons injured from the self
funded persons operation maintenance and
use of motor vehicles as would an insurer
issuing a pohcv to the self funded person )
Neel i State K>i P 2d 581 5M (Ltah Ct
App 1993) ( The States election to *elf in
suie cannot become a stumbling block to the
swift iecover> of PIP benefits ) Although
parts of IML Ft eight can be lead to claiifv,
the courts use of the word personally the
holding lemains confusing
The coui t s discrimination of woi kei s theo
t\ is also troubling It ignore^ the legisla

ture's requirement that no fault coverage ap
ply to "(e}vei v policy of (auto| insurance"
$ 31A-22-302(2)
Thus conti a n to IML
FT eight the no fault statute effective!} lm
posed upon all owners of motor vehiclesincluding employeis—an additional binder to
buy PIP coveiage foi then vehicles
The legislatuie chose to legulate this as
pect of insuiance foi all owneis of motor
vehicles including employeis who own the
motoi vehicles used in then businesses
This can hardly be deemed discilmination
"[OJur legislature has the power and duty to
promote the public health, safety and gener
al welfare of all citizens In furtheiance of
that power and duty, conditions and regula
tions foi the opeiation of motoi vehicles on
our public roads and highways ate a pioper
subject for legislative action " Stale v Ste
vens 718 P2d 398 399 (Utah 1986) (per
cunam) (footnote omitted) Indeed, the only
discrimination that is involved here arises
from IML FJ eight One who is injured in a
motor vehicle accident and is coveied by
wor kers compensation is entitled to less ben
efits than anothei who is also injured in such
an accident but is not covered by woikers
compensation
B

Utah Code Ann

§

J1A-22-J09U)

The most troubling aspect of IML Ft eight
is its cursory treatment of the statute that
dnectly confronts this issue The no fault
statute explicitly piovides "The benefits pav
able to dny injuied person under (the PIP
statute! are ieduced by (a) an\ benefits
which that peison leceives oi is entitled to
receive as a result of an accident covered in
this code undei anv workers compensation
or similar statutoi y plan
^ 31A-22309(3) At the time IML FJ eight was decid
ed the substantially identical statute was
numbered at section 31-41-7(3) (Supp 1973)
I MI F night
parsing

mentions tin statute, onlv in

If theic be an argument that the NoFault Act supcisedes the Woi kmen s Com
pensation Act because it allows foi deduc
tion of Woikmens Compensation pav
merits from a No-Fault insurance judg
ment oi settlement constitutionally it

NEEL v. STATE
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would appear to be flattened, since the
added compensation thus afforded obviously would discriminate in favor of one type
of employee, at the expense of an employer, and to the exclusion of others.
IML Freight, 538 P.2d at 297. We disagree
with this analysis.
"The court's principal duty in interpreting
statutes is to determine legislative intent,
and the best evidence of legislative intent is
the plain language of the statute." Sullivan
v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877,
879 (Utah 1993) (citing Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906
(Utah 1984)). "[W]e presume that the Legislature used each term advisedly, and we give
effect to each term according to its ordinary
and accepted meaning." Versluis v. Guaranty NaTl Cos., 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992).
[3] The plain language of section 31A22-309(3)(a) indicates that the legislature
considered the very issue that is at hand in
this case and decided that PIP benefits are
payable to an injured employee but that
these benefits are reduced by "any benefits
which that person receives . . under
workers' compensation." In other words, an
injured party should be able to receive PIP
benefits to the extent that those benefits are
not already paid by workers' compensation.
The court of appeals has already so interpreted the statute.
We interpret [section 31A-22-309(3)(a) 1 as
expressing the legislature's determination
that, as between a no-fault insurer and a
workers' compensation insurer
, the nofault insurer should not bear the burden of
paying the benefits due to an employee
accidently injured in the course of employment even if that injury occurred in a
vehicle covered by the requisite no-fault
insurance Accordingly, the no-fault insurer is permitted by this statute to exclude from coverage provided under its
insurance policy any liability for injuries
that are compensable under the ivorkers'
compensation statute
Bevans v Industrial Comm'n 790 P.2d 573,
577 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (emphasis added)
Thus where an accident is covered by both
workers' compensation and no-fault insurance, the statute permits a no-fault insurer to

exclude some liability that which is compensable under workers' compensation—but not
all liability.
In oral argument, the State contended that
the PIP statute was intended to benefit only
employees driving their own vehicles, not
employees driving their employers' vehicles.
This strained interpretation would have us
lead language into an otherwise unambiguous statute. The State cites no authority for
this assertion, and our own research has not
uncovered any case supporting this theory.
Although there is some split of authority
on whether the exclusive remedy clause bars
an action by employees against their employers' no-fault insurance, the division is primarily due to the differing language of the various no-fault statutes. See 2A Arthur Larson,
The Law of Workmen's
Compensation
§ 71.24(e), at 14-68 (1994); Vitauts M Gulbis, Annotation, Validity and Construction of
No-Fault Insurance Plans Providing for
Reduction of Benefits Otherwise Payable by
Amounts Receivable From Independent Collateral Sources, 10 A.L.R.4th 996, 1010-13
(1981).
No split of authority appears, however, in
states whose no-fault statutes specifically
provide that PIP benefits will be reduced by
workers' compensation benefits as does section 31A-22-309(3)(a). These states have
uniformly allowed both types of benefits
Sec, c g., Tate v. Industrial Claim Appeals
Office, 815 P.2d 15, 19 (Colo.1991) ("This
provision coordinates the workers' compensation and PIP benefits so that the injured
person does not receive duplicate benefits ");
Brown v Boston Old Colony Ins Co. 247
Ga. 287, 275 S.E.2d 651, 652 (1981) (declining
to go against clear statutory language to
deny PIP benefits to injured employee). .4//
state Ins Co v Sentry Ins Co of Michigan,
175 Mich.App 157, 437 N W.2d 338, 339
(1989) (statute's purpose "is to reduce the
basic cost of insurance by requiring a set-off
of those government benefits (including
workers' compensation/ that duplicate no
fault benefits and coordinating those benefits
a victim may receive"), Carriers Ins Co i
Burakowsku 93 Misc.2d 100, 402 N Y S.2d
333, 334 (1978) (declining to go against clearstatutory language to deny PIP benefit? to
injured employee).
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This interpretation is consistent with that
of a respected insurance law treatise:
A provision of the no-fault law permitting
an offset of benefits received under worker's compensation laws
rather than the
total disqualification of employed persons,
is the customary approach. Thus, while
the PIP insurer has no absolute defense, it
mat/ receive a eredd for the compensation
payments which have been received.
8D John A. Appleman, Insurance Law and
Practice S 5187. at 574-75 (1981) (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis added).1
14} Had the legislature intended PIP insurers to have an absolute defense against
injured employees, lawmakers could have
easily added language to the statute indicating this intent. Interestingly, in wording the
uninsured and undermsured motorist coverage statute, the legislature did that very
thing by adding this language: "This coverage does not apply to an employee, who is
injured by an uninsured motorist, whose exclusive remedy is provided by Title 35. Chapter I. Workers' Compensation " $ 31A-22305(4)()»)(ii). No similar language is included
in the PIP statutes, and we have " no power
to rewrite a statute to make it conform to an
intention not expressed.'" hi re Criminal
lurcstiuutmn.
754 P.2d 033. 040 (Utah 1988)
(quoting Mountain States 7W. A'- 777. Co. c
Public Sen- Ctwnii'u. 107 Utah 502. 505. 155
P.2d 184. 185 (Utah 1945))
III
CONCLUSION
(5, 0| This case is simpb an action by an
employee. Neel. against her employer's nofault insurer The State's designated insurer
here is the State itself The workers' compensation exclusivity provision does not bar
this action No-fault insurers, including selfinsurers, are required to pa> F'lP benefits to
injured employees to the extent those benefits exceed workers' compensation benefits
1.
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We reverse the district court's grant of
summary judgment and remand to the trial
court for further proceedings.
" Z I M M E R M A N . C.J.. STEWART.
Associate C.J., and D U R H A M and
RL-SSON. .)<).. concur.
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[71 Although the State's self-insurance
program excludes PIP benefits to any person
entitled to workers' compensation benefits,
this exclusion is not in harmony with statutory requirements and is therefore invalid.
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call 712 P.2d 231. 233
(Utah 1985) ("An insurer has the right to
contract with an insured as to the risks it will
or will not assume, as long as neither statutory law nor public policy is violated."); see
tdso Ferro v. Utah Dep't of Commerce. 828
P.2d 507, 512 n. 7 (Utah Ct.App.1992) ("If an
agency regulation is not in harmony uith (a)
statute, it is invalid").
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In so holding, we overrule IML
Freight
insofar as it is inconsistent with this opinion.
We are keenly aware of the doctrine of stare
decisis and its importance as " 'a cornerstone
of the Anglo-American jurisprudence that is
crucial to the predictability of the law and
the fairness of adjudication.' " State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393. 399 (1994) (quoting State
v. Tlmrman,
84G P.2d 125G. 12G9 (Utah
1993)).
However, in the case of IML
Freight we are " 'clearly convinced that the
rule was originally erroneous
and that
more good than harm will come by departing
from [its] precedent.' " Menzies. 889 P.2d at
399 (quoting John Hanna, The Role of Precedent in Judicial Decision, 2 Vill.L.Kev. 367,
3G7 (1957)).
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